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I will not comment on Jennifer Hochschild’s illuminating
discussion of the different ways in which various kinds of
submissions to Perspectives on Politics fail to be problem-
driven, and on the wise editorial feedback she gave to the
authors. Her editorship of the first three volumes has set a
high bar for those who will follow. She has done a major a
service not only for the political science profession, but also
for those outside it who want to learn what political science
can add to their understanding of politics.
Turning to Hochschild’s second set of remarks about
perspective-driven research, I agree with the substance of her
point. However, Occam’s razor counsels against creating a
new category here. What Hochschild has in mind goes not so
much to the generality or otherwise of the claim as to its ar-
resting character: describing something in a new way that
pulls you up short and makes you think about the phenom-
enon differently. This I deal with in Flight under the rubric of
“problematizing redescriptions.” Examples I give are rechar-
acterizing the Westphalian system of sovereign national states
as global Apartheid, or recharacterizing bipartisan agreement
as collusion in restraint of democracy.1
Such alternative descriptions invoke a theory that is not
usually associated with the phenomenon in question. I agree
with Hochschild that this kind of redescription can be illumi-
nating even when it overreaches. This is because it highlights
an unexamined assumption in the prevailing way of seeing
things. Most people take it for granted that respecting na-
tional sovereignty, within some limits, is morally benign and
that bipartisan agreement is a good thing in democratic poli-
tics. The redescriptions at least make us wonder. But to go
beyond being arrestingly thought-provoking, there has to be
more: a two step process, I argue, by which one shows first
that an important feature of what needs to be accounted for is
missed by the prevailing characterization, and a demonstra-
tion that the proposed recharacterization speaks to the inad-
equacies of the prior account. One mark of success will be
persuading skeptics and adherents of the old view, as distinct
from those who were already partisans of the proposed new
view. This, I argue in Flight, is where so much that travels
under the rational choice banner does so poorly.2 An example
of success—though not a rational choice one—that I discuss
is the reexamination of industrial policy in capitalist democra-
cies through the lens of liberal corporatism rather than plural-
ism. This enabled researchers to understand a great deal more
of how industrial policy comes to take the form it does, and the
different roles played by business, organized labor, and gov-
ernment in that process, than the competing Marxist and plu-
ralist visions that had prevailed hitherto.3
Gerry Mackie’s comment leaves me unpersuaded of the
advantages of method-driven research as he describes him-
self as having engaged in it. Granted, scouring the social world
for Schelling-conventions would be dishonest if one pretended
to find them when they were absent. Mackie is to be com-
mended for not doing this. Nonetheless, it is far from obvious
that Schelling-conventions are the best place to start when
trying to understand a particular phenomenon such as inher-
itance practices. It would depend on what one wanted to know
about them, but I would start with the existing theories of how
they came to be established in a particular setting and then
ask what—if anything—those accounts failed to explain. If
that was something I wanted to know, then I would cast about
for alternatives and see how well they did in accounting for
the phenomenon in question.
As for Mackie’s discussion of foot-binding and female
genital cutting, I fail to see why one has to crank up a bunch
of game theory to get to the hypothesis that, if someone does
something that seems harmful to themselves or someone we
have reasons for thinking that they care about, then there
may be some greater harm they are trying to avoid. Nor does
one need it to suppose that, if the greater harm were removed,
then the people in question would no longer engage in the
lesser harm. Indeed, one need not even know what a coordi-
nation game is to consider this a plausible possibility. Mackie’s
suggestion that Dahl failed to consider possibilities of this
sort in Who Governs? “because he was blinded by behavior-
alist methodology” scarcely meets the objection. Nothing in
Who Governs? implies that people do not accept lesser harms
to avoid greater ones, and nothing in Mackie’s research in-
volves looking at anything other than behavior.
Mackie’s comment seems to me to be unnecessarily self-
flagellating in that his major book, Democracy Defended, is
manifestly a problem-driven enterprise.4 In it he takes on the
literature that was motivated by the theoretical possibility of
voting cycles first observed by Condorcet and formalized by
Kenneth Arrow, and he asks whether such cycles actually oc-
cur in practice. His exhaustive investigation of virtually every
alleged instance of a cycle in the literature of the past several
decades reveals them to have been misidentified, supporting
his conclusion that the supposed threat to democracy is chi-
merical. Is there a real problem here?, Mackie asked, and an-
swered: no. We are all in his debt for having debunked this
spurious though influential literature.
I have considerable admiration for David Laitin’s empiri-
cal work in political science, but his comment on Flight is dis-
appointingly obtuse. A good title for it would be “Shooting the
Messenger with Non-Sequiturs,” inasmuch as he tries to di-
rect a series of barbs at me that for the most part fail to engage
with the argument of the book. When he does engage, he gets
it badly wrong.
The first non-sequitur is Laitin’s lament that although I
complain of a flight from reality in the human sciences, “the
text is virtually empty of any supported claims about that real-
ity.” Flight is a collection of methodological essays, not a
summary of my substantive work. As he acknowledges in a
garbled footnote, my substantive work is published elsewhere.5
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.998143
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Moreover, only by engaging in the most tortured imaginable
reading of Chapter 1 could anyone take Wendt and me to be
say-ing there that philosophers “need not be worried about
saying true things about the world.” We defend philosophical
realism as a desirable basis for social research on the grounds
that it does not bias the enterprise in ways that the going
alternatives do, but we also argue that Roy Bhaskar and others
are mistaken in believing that a commitment to philosophical
realism by itself entails the truth of any particular theory about
the world. That, we argue, is a task for social research, not
armchair reflection.
By the same token, my criticism of Laitin’s work in Flight
is not directed at his substantive work on Africa, language
and political identities, or civil war, but rather at his proposal
to do for political science teaching what Samuelson did for
economics teaching. This proposal does indeed rest on a de-
nial of reality, but not for the reasons Laitin reports me as
having given. His claim is that political scientists should teach
a universal introductory political science course, the syllabus
for which Laitin has already designed. I argued in Chapter 6 of
Flight that the type of standardization he seeks has been a
bad development in economics, divorcing undergraduate
teaching for the controversies at the research frontiers of the
discipline and alienating serious scholars from undergradu-
ate teaching. The practice in political science, where the plu-
rality of introductory courses reflects the reality that scholars
disagree on what the basic problems of politics are, is, I ar-
gued, superior. It is curious that this sometime student of
hegemony misses the irony of his proposing that current teach-
ers and future generations of students all be disciplined by
his view of these matters.
Laitin’s attempt to sidestep this by saying that he gives
“primacy to political theory in addressing consequential real-
world concerns that have motivated participants in the tradi-
tion for two millennia” scarcely meets the objection. There are
many ways of reading the classic theorists in the tradition. As
I noted in my original discussion, the basic challenges about
democracy that Laitin extracts from the tradition reflect a view
of democracy in which solving Arrow’s problem is important.
On my view, by contrast, preference-aggregation is compara-
tively unimportant; things like fostering political competition
and opposition matter more. And I noted that many political
scientists who teach about democracy would disagree with us
and with one another more than Laitin and I do. In this context,
suggesting that there is an accepted view of the matter that
can be extracted from the tradition “involves kidding ourselves
or kidding our students. I guess the latter is worse, but the
former has little to commend it either.” Kidding the outside
world in order to extract funds from granting agencies, which
he comes close to advocating as well, hardly seems much bet-
ter.6
My preference is that we continue teaching undergradu-
ates in ways that reflect the disagreements at the research
frontiers of the discipline, betting for the long haul on the
competition of ideas instead of captive audiences for all the
reasons that John Stuart Mill maintained that we should. In the
short run, this will at least yield courses that engage teachers
and students more than serving up chapter three of some text-
book in week three of every semester in every department in
the country. Fortunately, it seems unlikely to me that the di-
verse reality of the political science discipline will bend to
Laitin’s will any time soon. But I find it unfortunate that he
believes that it should. Contra his suggestion that I am op-
posed to changing the political science curriculum, I have no
desire to stop him from teaching it as he sees fit and trying to
convince people that he is right. My own introductory course
(based on a rather different account of the Western tradition of
political theory than Laitin’s) seeks to do just that. When I
turned the course into a book, rather than propose that it be-
come the universal standard, I noted in the preface that I would
be satisfied “if instructors find it a helpful teaching tool, yet
feel the need to argue with it as they teach it.”7 That seems to
me the appropriate aspiration.
A second non-sequitur concerns Laitin’s charge, piggy-
backing on Ferejohn and Satz’s critique of Pathologies of Ra-
tional Choice Theory, that advocating problem-driven research
allegedly ignores the fact that there is no pre-theoretical way
of characterizing problems. I will not repeat our response to
Ferejohn and Satz here, which can be found in Chapter 2 of
Flight. The matter is taken up in greater depth in (and indeed is
the central topic of) Chapter 5, though you would never know
this from reading Laitin’s comment. In that chapter I note that
every political phenomenon admits of multiple true descrip-
tions, each of which invites a different type of explanation—
reflecting the inevitability of theory-ladenness. Much of what
is contentious in political science comes down to disagree-
ments over which description is most apt, with partisans of
different reductionist enterprises—Marxist, rational-choice,
feminist, functionalist, and others—proposing their preferred
cut as the right one.8 No architectonic venture of this kind has
much of a track record of success in political science; indeed,
this is a major reason why no single conception of what the
discipline is or should be has won the day. Against all such
ventures I argue for an anti-reductionist view of political expla-
nation, one that jettisons the assumption that a particular cut
will be the right one for the varied kinds of things political
scientists study. My approach places the burden of justifica-
tion for adopting a particular cut for a particular phenomenon
on the researcher rather than on the skeptic. Shouldering this
burden includes showing why the proposed cut illuminates
more than the going alternatives—something that is seldom
attempted in practice.
A third non-sequitur concerns Laitin’s allegation that my
criterion for praising work is that it be authored by Yale col-
leagues. Tempting as it is to call this a low blow, that would
suggest that it actually gets off the ground. No matter that I
criticize Robert Dahl’s behavioral account of power and de-
fend John Gaventa’s realist account as superior. As for his
claim that I “hold back” my “full fire” with respect to my dis-
cussion of my colleagues Alan Gerber and Donald Green, Laitin
both misreports what I say about their field experiments and
gets the import of my discussion of them exactly backwards. I
never claim that “Gerber and Green choose their problem
(whether it is more efficient to phone or visit people if you
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seek their vote) based on its tractability with the experimental
method that they are promoting.” In fact, I have no idea how
they chose this particular problem. What I do say, which Laitin
ignores, is that if the research agenda for political science
starts to be driven by what can be studied by means of field
experiments, this will exclude the vast amount of what draws
people to political science in the first place. This is the partial
list I give: “the effects of regime type on the economy, and
vice versa; the determinants of peace, war, and revolution;
the causes and consequences of the trend toward creating
independent central banks; the causes and consequences of
the growth in transnational political and economic institu-
tions; the relative merits of alternative policies for achieving
racial integration, such as mandatory bussing, magnet schools,
and voluntary desegregation plans; the importance of consti-
tutional courts in protecting civil liberties, property rights,
and limiting the power of legislatures; the effects of other
institutional arrangements, such as parliamentarism v.
presidentialism, unicameralism v. bicameralism, federalism v.
centralism on such things as the distribution of income and
wealth, the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies, and the
types of social policies that are enacted; the dynamics of
political negotiations to institute democracy. I could go on,
but you get the point.”9 Apparently Laitin didn’t.
Perhaps Laitin thinks I pull my punches because I note
that there is a class of phenomena that do lend themselves to
field experiments, to wit, “the study of behavioral variation in
settings where the institutional context is relatively fixed and
where the stakes are comparatively low, so that the kinds of
interventions required do not violate accepted ethical criteria
for experimentation on human subjects.” But part of my
antireductionist message is that people should abandon the
search for the one-method-fits-all holy grail of political sci-
ence. The phenomena that interest political scientists vary
too much for this to make sense. We should avoid the shell
game where the successes of one method are compared to the
failures of another which is then judged to be ready for the
scrap heap. With methods, I argue, as with people: “If you
focus only on their limitations you will always be disap-
pointed.”10 Here it might be worth reiterating that Green and I
never declared rational choice explanations to be worthless;
only that their indiscriminate application in political science
had not yielded identifiable advances in knowledge. Indeed
we suggested that rational choice explanations might be ex-
pected to do well when the following conditions hold: (i) stakes
are high and players are self-conscious optimizers; (ii) prefer-
ences are well-ordered and relatively stable; (iii) there is a
clear range of options and little scope for strategic innova-
tion; (iv) the strategic complexity of the situation is not over-
whelming for the actors whose strategic capabilities must not
differ significantly from one another; and (v) actors have the
capacity to learn from feedback in the environment and adapt.11
Even within an appropriately specified domain, we should
never lose sight of the fact that all the methods political scien-
tists employ run into enormous difficulties when matched with
the complexities of actual politics. Most quantitative studies
are plagued by the bad data that scholars have to work with.
Case studies might be unrepresentative and more often than
not are selected either because of the idiosyncratic interests of
the researcher or on the dependent variable—or both. Public
opinion surveys are weak guides to what people believe for a
host of well-known reasons. Interviews involve their own prob-
lems of potential bias and manipulation. Rational choice appli-
cations often run afoul one or more of the strictures mentioned
above. Archival work limits the researcher to what happens to
have been preserved and is available. Given this reality, often
the best that can be done is to surround the problem with
multiple methods rather than opt for one. Some of the best
work in political science does exactly that. Eric Schickler’s Dis-
jointed Pluralism and Dan Carpenter’s The Forging of Bu-
reaucratic Autonomy are recent examples that come to mind.12
As for Laitin’s claim that in my account of problem-driven
research “any problem will do,” I go out of my way to warn
those who might be seduced by the promise of field experi-
ments (they confer the advantages of experimental controls
without being subject to the questions about external validity
that typically plague lab experiments in psychology) that part
of what spawned the model-mania of the 1990s was the disaf-
fection with the trivial, if tractable, questions that consumed a
good deal of 1960s behaviorism in the study of American
politics. As a result, I argue, the mainstream of political sci-
ence that they came to define “seemed to others to be both
utterly devoid of theoretical ambition as well as detached from
consequential questions of politics; frankly boring. To para-
phrase Kant, theoretical ambition without empirical research
may well be vacuous, but empirical research without theoreti-
cal ambition will be blind.”13 Making a convincing case for the
importance of the problem under study is integral to problem-
driven political science on my account. It trumps method-
ological tractability. When the problems that are recognized
as important are difficult to study with the available methods,
the task of political theorists is to keep them on the agenda
“and challenge the ingenuity of who are sufficiently open-
minded to devise creative ways of grappling with them.”14
Hopefully, Laitin agrees.
Notes
1
 Ian Shapiro, The Flight From Reality in the Human Sciences
(Princeton University Press, 2005), 199-203.
2
 Hence my criticism of Bawn on ideologies as devices for main-
taining group solidarity and Hardin on constitutions as coordinating
devices (Flight, 185-6) that David Laitin finds perplexing.
3
 Flight, 199-202.
4
 Gerry Mackie, Democracy Defended (Cambridge University
Press, 2003).
5
 The footnote is garbled inasmuch as my recent work on South
Africa is not about injustice and my recent work on injustice is not
about South Africa.
6
 Flight, 207-8.
7
 Ian Shapiro, The Moral Foundations of Politics (Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2003), xii.
8
 See especially Flight, 187-8, 199-203.
9
 Flight, 197.
10
 Flight, 198-99.
11
 Flight, 94.
19
12
 Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation
and Development in the U.S. Congress (Princeton University Press,
2001); Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy:
Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies,
Introduction
Naomi Choi
University of California, Berkeley
nchoi@socrates.berkeley.edu
A symposium on the idea of “concepts” is a tricky matter.
For one thing, the relevant issues have a way of persistently
reflecting back on themselves. And when they do, the task
becomes a knottier one of trying to conceptualize what it means
to conceptualize, which hurls us headlong into debates about
theory and practice and the endless loops associated with
those. The usual editorial challenges of characterizing a plural-
ity of perspectives are thus compounded in this case. The
initial condition of recognizing the contestedness of concep-
tual meanings, for instance, must be that participants in a de-
bate about it speak in their own diverse terms, traditions, aims,
and demands, where possibly a plurality of conversations en-
sues. The job is made all the more thorny by the fact that what
an adequate description of the terrain of debates about con-
cepts should look like is itself an open question, depending on
the various purposes one could invoke for thinking about them.
But I leave these admittedly not-so-trivial issues aside
for the moment to hit on the equally significant points of
convergence among the views presented here. For what these
authors are doing as a group is drawing our attention to the
often neglected set of considerations about how we should
understand concepts even before we try to do the various
things we could do with them. And there is good reason to
commend this general stance, regardless of where one stands
on some of the particulars, because so much of what passes
for scholarship in political science today proceeds without a
trace of due attention to issues like the scope and boundaries
of concepts (cf. Choi, Freeden), the real world contestation
over meanings and usage (cf. Davis), and legitimate versus
illegitimate conceptual applications (cf. Bevir). It is not an
exaggeration to say that most of the research emanating from
the scholarly mills today evinces little or no concern for these
at all. Dominating our top journals are arguments of the ilk
that try to demonstrate the impact of x on y with a narrow
explication of the statistical significance thereof, e.g. articles
that identify the particular causes of institutional change, voter
turnout, or the impact of GDP on democratic consolidation, or
the possibilities for a “democratic peace,” to name a few.
The overwhelming emphasis of the discipline is squarely
on attempts to model regularities in the social world, typically
by isolating variables and demonstrating their seeming causal
affectabilities against each other. Whatever one’s view about
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this, closer attention ought to be paid to the ways that con-
cepts actually operate, for example, to the functions they serve
in academic research versus real world politics (cf., Freeden,
Davis). Doing so could lead us to insights that advance our
pursuit of knowledge and may even elevate the character of
the discipline as a whole. To be sure, it would alter not only the
kinds of research outcomes we get but also the process of
inquiry itself (cf., Choi, Bevir). If these authors are right, then
paying closer attention to concepts would heighten our aware-
ness of the interaction and inter-relations between variables,
in addition to merely their discreet causal effects. It may help
us to resolve some messy operationalization issues for par-
ticular concepts, or at least motivate us to come up with ad-
equate ways of explaining processes, events, actions, or speech
that are by nature essentially contested and irreducibly con-
testable.
To begin, Freeden makes a concerted effort to draw spe-
cific parameters around concepts that are characteristically
political in nature, even while simultaneously showing us the
impossibility of establishing boundaries that are static, or in
any way pre-determined in their content. Part of the difficulty
lies in what he lays out as the fundamentally evaluative na-
ture of political concepts. He offers a taxonomical analysis of
the relative normative weights that political concepts carry in
practice–at the intersecting levels of significance, legitimacy,
and intensity–that set political concepts apart from any other
run-of-the-mill concept. In studying politics, therefore, we have
reason to be alert to the structural aspects of concepts that do
not readily meet the eye but nonetheless operate in multiple
and dynamic ways–by discursive, illocutionary, or even sub-
versive means.
Choi is much less comfortable with the notion of the “po-
litical” as a separate or privileged category of concepts. Rather,
she argues that all human action and social practices, includ-
ing political science (itself a social practice not unlike those
we seek to gain knowledge about), are each imbued with what-
ever meanings its practitioners attach to their concepts, and
are therefore coextensive with the theories, purposes, and
beliefs of its participants. What she argues is required for
explanation-giving is a “family resemblances approach” to
concepts that makes possible hermeneutical accounts that
elucidate the particular concepts through which the mean-
ings of agents operate. She contends that while concepts
essentially constitute social practices, they are vague, by na-
ture, because of the variable ways that people can construe
meanings. Thus the vagueness of concepts is something we
as political scientists should try to get more comfortable with
and not try to skirt or pretend away; certainly not by various
means of conceptual abstraction and reification, or mechani-
